Borderlands

Policing Beyond Borders: China’s Law-Enforcement Expansion in the Mekong Region

Simon Menet


The People’s Republic of China (PRC) faces a mounting challenge from transnational organized crime along its southern periphery. Myanmar has become the world’s most criminalized state, particularly after the 2021 military coup, providing a safe haven for illicit economies ranging from drug, human, and arms trafficking to illegal mining, cybercrime, and financial crimes.1 Other Mekong countries have also emerged as criminal hotspots, with Cambodia hosting around 100,000 trafficked victims in scam centers, according to a UN estimate.2 Sustained by corruption, weak governance, and entrenched Chinese criminal networks, these activities have disproportionately targeted Chinese nationals and thus have been framed as a matter of national security by the party-state.

In response, the PRC Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and other security agencies have intensified law-enforcement efforts in the Mekong region, designated as a “pilot zone” (实验区) for the Global Security Initiative (全球安全倡议). Chinese authorities have increased pressure on their neighbors and multiplied joint operations, resulting in the arrest and deportation of over 55,000 individuals from scam centers in northern Myanmar between August 2023 and April 2025.3 At the same time, Beijing has sought to pursue subregional security mechanisms under its leadership. These include coordinated Mekong river patrols with Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand, which were launched in 2011, and the Lancang-Mekong Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation Center (LM-LECC), a spin-off intergovernmental body established in Yunnan in 2017 within the broader Lancang-Mekong Cooperation framework.

Often dismissed as symbolic, these initiatives have nonetheless helped cement China’s police presence and, as a result, expand its security influence across its borderlands. The Chinese party-state views national security as an integrated continuum linking internal and external security and nontraditional and traditional security. Political security—i.e., ensuring the regime’s stability and centrality—is at its core. This vision, enshrined in the “holistic national security concept” (总体国家安全观) announced by Xi Jinping in 2014, elevates law enforcement and public security work as both a tool of internal control and a vehicle for advancing China’s broader foreign policy agenda.

This essay argues that Chinese-led law-enforcement engagements in the Mekong have not only normalized Beijing’s extraterritorial policing footprint but also begun to reshape regional security governance. China’s growing security influence is significant but uneven. The PRC is far from the region’s sole security provider and its role is constrained by geopolitical dynamics, legal complexities, and the inherent limits of police cooperation.

A Deteriorating Crime Landscape on China’s Doorstep

Transnational organized crime and illicit activities have long proliferated south of China’s Yunnan and Guangxi Provinces. The Golden Triangle—a rugged, mountainous area of approximately 200,000 square kilometers at the junction of Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand—has been one of the world’s largest opium-producing areas since the early 1950s and one of the largest hubs for the production of synthetics drugs, most notably methamphetamines. Despite decades of repressive policies, drug production and trafficking have persisted and even expanded, facilitated by porous borders and improved connectivity. The meth trade alone generates an estimated $80 billion annually in East and Southeast Asia, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).4

Beyond narcotics, mainland Southeast Asia has historically been a hotspot for various forms of illicit activity, including human trafficking, arms smuggling, and resource-related crime. Illegal mining, in particular, devastates ecosystems and local livelihoods across the region. In northern parts of war-torn Myanmar, Chinese companies have deepened their footprint in gold and rare earths mining, often through deals involving both organized crime groups and armed factions.5 Severe heavy-metal contamination of Thailand’s rivers and increasing public scrutiny have not hindered these extractive operations, largely due to their strategic value for the PRC.6 Myanmar is now China’s primary rare earth supplier, accounting for nearly two-thirds of its annual imports of heavy rare earth elements.7

In recent years, telecom and online fraud (电信诈骗)8 have profoundly transformed the Mekong crime landscape for the worse. Predominantly orchestrated by decentralized, network-based Chinese criminal syndicates, these schemes operate from cross-border economic zones, turned into industry-scale scam compounds. From Shwe Kokko in Myanmar’s Myawaddy area to Thmor Da in Cambodia and the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Laos’s Bokeo Province, these lawless enclaves thrive in vulnerable areas where state oversight is weak and national elites are complicit. Criminal networks exploit advanced technologies such as generative artificial intelligence and cryptocurrencies, while regional shifts in the gambling sector create new opportunities for scam. The PRC’s domestic crackdown on online gambling, in particular, pushed many cyber-enabled fraud operations across its borders, where they expanded rapidly in mainland Southeast Asia. The system is further sustained by agile organizational structures, allowing groups to evade growing international law-enforcement efforts by moving from one zone to another, and the system’s highly lucrative nature. In one high-profile case in Singapore, a transnational enterprise centered on a handful of Chinese nationals laundered an estimated $2.2 billion in scam-related profits.9 Overall, the UNODC found that East and Southeast Asian countries have collectively lost up to $37 billion to cyber-enabled fraud.10

The economic toll is compounded by tragic social consequences. Hundreds of thousands of victims from nearly 80 countries have been trafficked into scam centers, in conditions that the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia has described as a “living hell.”11 While operations recruit skilled developers and engineers joining willingly from Southeast Asia, Africa, India, and Europe, the large majority of individuals are coerced into criminal activity. Chinese nationals are overwhelmingly represented among these trafficked victims and fraud targets, reflecting both the origins of most criminal groups involved and the proximity of scam operations to China’s territory. Yunnan Province alone shares a 4,060-kilometer land border with Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam and encompasses 26 entry ports. Once considered remote, these borderlands have become vital economic hubs, supporting the growing trade between the PRC and mainland Southeast Asia valued around $437 billion in 2024.12 This amounts to nearly half of China’s total bilateral trade with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).13 Coincidentally, they have served as testing grounds for fraud schemes that are now radiating outward to Pacific Island nations, Sri Lanka, Dubai, and even farther.14

The sheer scale of scam centers constitutes not only a direct national security risk to the PRC but also a source of regional instability, as illustrated by the recent deadly clashes between Thailand and Cambodia.15 Analysts argue that the escalation may be partly attributable to Thailand’s efforts to suppress Cambodian scam infrastructure and tycoons allegedly linked to Hun Sen.16A comparable pattern can be observed in Myanmar, where illicit economies function as tools of leverage in the ongoing power struggle between the military and ethnic armed organizations.17This crime-conflict nexus underscores the growing convergence between nontraditional security issues and conventional military threats—a continuum integral to the broader conception of security in both Southeast Asia and China, where nontraditional threats are often assessed in terms of regime stability.18 This logic is further evident in China’s expanding security presence in the Mekong, notably through deepened law enforcement and police cooperation.

China’s Growing Law-Enforcement Footprint in the Mekong: From Limited Antidrug Cooperation to Chinese-Led Regional Mechanisms

Rising crime in the Mekong prompted the PRC and its Southeast Asian neighbors to initiate police cooperation in the 1970s, marking Beijing’s early foray into international law enforcement. Cooperation developed in the 1990s after China joined Interpol in 1984 and signed regional and bilateral anti-narcotics agreements. In the 2000s the agenda broadened to include trafficking in drugs, humans, and arms, as well as piracy, terrorism, money laundering, and cybercrime.

This period also saw Beijing conclude extradition treaties with Cambodia (1999), Laos (2002), Thailand (1993), and Vietnam (1998), alongside mutual legal assistance treaties with Laos (1999), Thailand (1994 and 2003), and Vietnam (1998).19 Yet, their impact has been limited. Myanmar never signed such agreements, and differences in legal systems, lengthy procedures, and political constraints made informal cooperation the dominant approach—a pattern that still prevails today.20

Until the 2010s, the PRC largely refrained from deepening its law-enforcement engagement with its southern neighbors. This restraint reflected less its so-called noninterference policy21 than three underlying factors: a long-standing reliance on local security forces to protect Chinese interests abroad, the degree of cooperation offered by host countries, and the party-state’s tolerance of criminal activity so long as it does not impinge on the regime’s “core interests” (核心利益).22 A critical turning point came in October 2011, when thirteen Chinese sailors were brutally murdered on the Mekong River. The incident spurred Beijing to expand its police presence abroad, a shift that has since accelerated, driven by the very same considerations that had previously encouraged restraint.

From reliance on local security forces to active police engagement. The PRC long depended on Mekong states’ security forces to safeguard Chinese interests, in part due to political and legal constraints on the use of force abroad.23 Persistent deficiencies by host countries, combined with the MPS’s growing international capabilities, drove a significant paradigm shift. After the 2011 killings, Beijing moved toward multilevel engagement. Regionally, this meant launching coordinated patrols on the Mekong River with Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand. Initially temporary, the mechanism evolved into routine monthly operations, gradually expanding to include joint exercises, land patrols, and capacity building. In 2017, cooperation was further institutionalized through the Lancang-Mekong Integrated Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation Center.24 China has also advanced issue-based frameworks, as illustrated by the February 2025 trilateral ministerial meeting with Thailand and Myanmar to coordinate efforts against telecom fraud.25 This followed the launch in August 2023 of a special anti-scam operation by police forces of China, Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos, supported by a dedicated center in Chiang Mai, Thailand.26

In parallel, China has intensified bilateral law-enforcement exchanges, structured around three pillars:

  • Institutional cooperation. Mekong states have become primary targets of the MPS foreign affairs work, a priority reinforced by Xi Jinping’s 2017 Interpol address and the Working Conference on Public Security International Cooperation held that year. Data collected shows that Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam accounted for a quarter of all 214 bilateral MPS meetings at ministerial levels between 2023 and 2025.27 Vietnam alone accounts for nearly half of China’s high-level security diplomacy in the region, as public security represents a core area of the party-state relations between the two countries. Notably, Hanoi and Beijing maintain both the Ministerial Meeting on Cooperation in Combating Crime and the Strategic Dialogue on Security, involving the MPS and the Ministry of State Security.28 The MPS also holds regular ministerial-level law-enforcement meetings with Cambodia and Myanmar.29
  • Operational cooperation. The MPS has multiplied joint operations against transnational organized crime, with scam centers as a recent priority. Headquarters in Beijing coordinate major operations, as evidenced by the visit of Assistant Minister Liu Zhongyi to a scam center area in Myawaddy in February 2025.30 The MPS relies heavily on provincial and municipal public security bureaus, which frequently dispatch international task forces. A team from the Shenzhen bureau, for instance, arrested leaders of the notorious Bai criminal family in northern Myanmar, after repeated missions in the area.31 Cooperation also extends to diaspora control through initiatives like the MPS-led Operation Fox Hunt (猎狐)—the international arm of Xi’s anticorruption campaign. Although most operations are conducted with the agreement or participation of host states, Chinese police have relied at times on covert operations, most prominently for the international manhunt of Naw Kham, mastermind of the 2011 Mekong attack, and a 2019 operation in which plain clothes officers from Anhui Province tracked and arrested a suspect in Laos. Reports also indicate undercover infiltration of scam centers in northern Myanmar.32
  • Technical cooperation. Capacity building has become a key feature of China’s international law-enforcement drive. Institutions like the Yunnan Police College serve as important training hubs to cultivate foreign officers and promote Chinese policing practices.33 Since 2002, Myanmar police, including intelligence personnel, have received annual training at academies in Yunnan, Guizhou, and Hubei. Thai officers have likewise joined programs, such as a 2022 cybercrime seminar at the Jiangxi Police Institute,34 and training sessions through Confucious Institutes in Thailand.35 Beyond training, China provides material assistance and institutional support, often free of charge. The construction of the Cambodian police headquarters and DNA lab and the installation of the Lao MPS internet network system are just a few examples. Beijing has also leveraged its tech companies to export subsidized surveillance and police tools across the region. Huawei, for instance, supplies Bangkok’s police surveillance grid and data integration platforms.

From host-country cautious collaboration to institutionalized cooperation. In 2011, China pushed through to establish Mekong patrols, and Thailand only agreed to the patrols on the condition that no Chinese boat would sail past the Chiang Saen port into its territory.36 China also had to bear most of the financial cost of the patrols37and provide vessels to Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand. Even then, Bangkok was initially reluctant to accept Chinese assistance for fear of damaging its international image.38 Similarly, all five Mekong countries agreed to join the LM-LECC and send officials to staff the center in Kunming and attend trainings in Yunnan or at other police academies. Yet, participation remains patchy, and the center has underperformed. In August 2025, China’s minister of foreign affairs Wang Yi openly acknowledged its shortcomings, urging efforts to make the LM-LECC “more substantive and stronger.”39

The five Mekong states have generally welcomed greater Chinese law-enforcement engagement, albeit on their own terms. In Myanmar the MPS has conducted major operations against scam centers, with the support of a junta historically wary of Beijing’s intentions. Diplomatic isolation, domestic instability, and China’s growing leverage over Myanmar’s military rulers have fostered cooperation, though still short of an extradition treaty or a permanent Chinese police presence comparable to Phnom Penh’s model. Cambodia, often portrayed as Beijing’s closest partner in law enforcement, has in fact moved unevenly. The Cambodian government cracked down on Chinese-linked crime only after repeated pressure from Beijing, banning online gambling in 2019 and hosting China’s first overseas bilateral police center. Despite these steps, Cambodia remains a hub for scam and illicit activities, which are shielded in part by the complicity of political and business elites.

In addition, growing cooperation with the PRC is unfolding alongside a series of regional and bilateral exchanges between Mekong states and external partners, including the UNODC, Interpol, the United States, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Canberra, for instance, supports cross-border cooperation through the Mekong-Australia Partnership on Transnational Crime, providing assistance in capacity building, information sharing, and policy analysis.40 Taipei also engages in discreet working-level cooperation with police in Vietnam and Cambodia, despite their adherence to the “one-China” policy, to address the involvement of Taiwanese nationals in scam operations.41

From tolerance to illicit activities to selective crime suppression. The expansion of Chinese investments, including through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, has created new opportunities for criminal networks. In high-profile cases like Cambodia’s Sihanoukville and the Golden Triangle SEZ, improved infrastructure and renewed financial and political capital, coupled with casino-driven economies and rampant corruption, have fostered gambling, scams, drug, human, and wildlife trafficking, as well as money laundering.42 In recent years, NGOs and law-enforcement agencies have documented these illicit activities, highlighting the role of figures like Zhao Wei, the U.S.-sanctioned Chinese casino tycoon behind the Golden Triangle SEZ,43 or Wan Kuok-koi (“Broken Tooth”), a leader of the 14K triad—one of the largest Chinese crime organizations—who leveraged BRI to expand scam and crypto-related schemes in both Sihanoukville and Myanmar’s Shwe Kokko.44

Royal Union Casino in Sihankouville, taken by the author in December 2023.

 

Despite well-known ties between BRI projects and criminal networks, the Chinese party-state has pursued a differentiated law-enforcement approach, in line with its long-standing opportunistic engagement with marginalized and criminal groups to support its policies. From Mao Zedong’s co-optation of the “Gelaohui” brotherhood during the revolutionary period to the involvement of Hong Kong triads in suppressing the 2019 democratic protests, the Chinese Communist Party has repeatedly exploited the influence of underworld actors in exchange for tolerating their illicit activities.45

Such tolerance, however, persists only insofar as the regime’s core interests remain intact. In Sihanoukville, for example, Beijing intervened and pressured Cambodian authorities only after Chinese-led criminality damaged China’s international reputation, jeopardized the sustainability of flagship BRI projects, and fueled domestic criticism.46 In northern Myanmar, the MPS went further, launching sweeping crackdowns in 2023–24 against the Kokang crime families that had long acted as partners and guarantors of stability for China’s investments.47 This shift came after scam centers targeting Chinese nationals triggered massive financial losses, widespread human trafficking scandals, and growing public anger.

Sihanoukville SEZ, photo taken by the author in December 2023.

By contrast, the Golden Triangle SEZ has only seen cosmetic operations against scam activities, and has so far avoided a Beijing-led shutdown. As one article notes, this selective leniency reflects several factors, including the vested interests of Lao elites in the SEZ and the country’s alignment with China’s broader strategic priorities.48 Zhao Wei has thus played a key role in cultivating Lao leaders, including former deputy prime minister Somsavat Lengsavad, who was reportedly a key architect of the Laos-China railway project.49 The Golden Triangle SEZ also offers the PRC a strategic foothold for expanding its security presence along the Mekong River at the junction of Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar.

China’s Mekong Law-Enforcement Drive: Blueprint for an Alternative Security Order

Beijing’s expanding law-enforcement efforts are beginning to reshape regional security governance in ways that align with the PRC’s broader foreign policy ambitions. The Mekong holds a significant position in Chinese strategic thinking.50 Under Xi Jinping’s peripheral diplomacy (周边外交),51 it also represents a priority area for advancing a “community with a shared future” (命运共同体)—that is, an alternative international order led by China and favorable to its strategic interests.52 Security, and law enforcement in particular, plays a crucial role in this vision, with the region serving as a “pilot zone” for the Global Security Initiative. One of Xi’s four flagship initiatives,53 the Global Security Initiative aims to promote an alternative, China-centric vision for the global security architecture.54 Beijing’s proposal draws from the “holistic national security concept,” articulating around twenty pillars—including economic security, resource security, data security, and overseas security, among others—with political security at its core.

This reconfiguration of regional security governance is materializing through the normalization of China’s status as a security provider. Beijing has established an extensive police footprint in response to rising organized crime, unmatched by other external powers. Chinese-led mechanisms such as the LM-LECC are incomplete, but they are among the few regional initiatives that complement existing frameworks under the UNODC and Interpol, with which China also actively cooperates.55 Sources highlight the effectiveness of China’s intervention, though coordination is sometimes inconsistent, with requests arriving from Beijing, police attachés, and other working-level channels.56

Yet normalization comes at a cost. China’s policing reinforces patterns of shared sovereignty already prevalent in vulnerable borderlands.57 This is especially evident in northern Laos, where local authorities rely on Chinese intervention to maintain security. Along the Lao banks of the Mekong, China has permanently stationed armed police officers in two Chinese-built facilities at Muang Mo and Ban Xieng Kok.58 Reports also point to Chinese police activity in the Golden Triangle SEZ,59 where Chinese leadership, the use of Mandarin as the lingua franca, and reliance on the renminbi illustrate Beijing’s enduring influence. Importantly, this penetration now extends beyond border areas into critical infrastructure. Private security companies with party-state ties, such as Frontier Services Group and Overseas Security Guardians, provide armed protection for the Lao railway.60 Frontier Services Group also cooperates with the Laotian military, delivering logistics support to its headquarters.61

Furthermore, China’s growing role as a security provider lies in the diffusion of a shared language of security with “Chinese characteristics.” The broad diplomatic support for the Global Security Initiative, with all five countries participating in the initiative, epitomizes this dynamic. The wording of high-level bilateral agreements promoting Xi Jinping’s “community with a shared future” provides further evidence. In that respect, the joint statement issued in April 2025 by Hanoi and Beijing during Xi’s state visit—promoting the “building of a China-Vietnam community with a shared future of strategic significance”—recognized defense and security as pillars of the relationship, encompassing cooperation against criminal activities and political security threats: “strengthen information and intelligence exchanges and experience sharing in counter-interference, counter-separatism, and prevention of hostile forces’ ‘color revolutions’ [颜色革命] and ‘peaceful evolution’ [和平演变].”62 A similar focus on political security has also featured in high-level exchanges with Laos and Cambodia.63

This emphasis has translated into the diffusion of norms and practices, particularly in anticorruption, judicial, and well-documented surveillance cooperation.64 Beijing has made rapid inroads in all three domains as Mekong regimes look at the domestic record of the Chinese party-state. In 2018 the chair of Cambodia’s Anti-Corruption Unit, Om Yentieng, publicly praised China as a “role model,” noting its “stern anti-corruption policy and practice.”65 Though highly scripted, such endorsements highlight close cooperation, reinforced by annual training of Cambodian officers in China since 2014. Judicial cooperation with Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam has also led to selective adoption of Chinese norms. For example, during a 2023 visit, Vietnamese prosecutors expressed strong interest in China’s prosecutorial practices, particularly its public interest litigation system, leniency mechanisms for guilty pleas, and coordination between prosecutors and supervisory bodies.66

Despite these advances, the emergence of a fully Chinese-led regional security order remains uncertain under current conditions. Law-enforcement cooperation is hindered by divergent definitions of cybercrime and other offenses, conflicting investigative procedures, limited technical capacity, and difficulties in prosecution and asset recovery.67 More broadly, international cooperation suffers from weak institutional mechanisms and insufficient political trust. Chinese multilateral security initiatives on the Mekong, meant to anchor the Global Security Initiative’s pilot zone, face irregular participation and have yet to deliver durable results against transnational crime. Meanwhile, external powers such as the United States, Australia, and Japan are expanding their own law-enforcement capacity-building programs, while enduring sensitivities over sovereignty continue to constrain Beijing’s ambitions.68

Conclusion

China’s expanding law-enforcement role in the Mekong illustrates both the ambition and limitations of its security diplomacy. By normalizing extraterritorial policing and embedding itself into regional security governance, Beijing has positioned law enforcement as a key vector of its Global Security Initiative and broader vision of a “community with a shared future.” Its ability to project power through police operations, bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, and security companies underscores how the PRC blends domestic security imperatives with foreign policy goals. This strategy has proved effective in addressing certain immediate challenges, such as scam centers in Myanmar’s Kokang area, while simultaneously exporting Chinese policing practices and norms to receptive Southeast Asian partners.

Yet the foundations of a Chinese-led regional security order remain fragile. Cooperation is uneven, constrained by sovereignty sensitivities, divergent legal frameworks, and persistent mistrust among Mekong states. Moreover, competing external actors are reinforcing their own security engagements, limiting Beijing’s ability to monopolize the field. China’s law-enforcement drive in the Mekong represents less a settled order than an evolving experiment—one that has deepened China’s influence but also exposed the tensions and contradictions of extending its policing abroad.

Future developments will ultimately hinge on several unresolved questions: Can China overcome the structural barriers (e.g., insufficient political trust, weak institutional mechanisms, and uneven technical capacities) that continue to impede sustained, trusted, and genuinely multilateral security cooperation? To what extent will Beijing succeed in curbing Chinese-linked criminal networks? Will the LM-LECC evolve into a functional platform on par with institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or will it remain largely symbolic? And how might local conflicts, including the recent border confrontations between Thailand and Cambodia, shape the trajectory of regional law-enforcement cooperation? Further research is also needed to examine how law-enforcement training programs in China influence the professional practices of Mekong police forces and whether they contribute to the emergence of a new cohort of regional security elites aligned with Beijing’s values and practices.

Simon Menet is a research fellow at the Paris-based think tank Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) and a PhD candidate in political science at the Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales (Inalco).

IMAGE CREDITS

Banner illustration by Nate Christenson ©The National Bureau of Asian Research.

 

ENDNOTES

 

  1. Myanmar ranks first on the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime’s 2023 Global Organized Crime Index, with the highest level of organized criminality globally. The country’s profile offers more details, available at https://ocindex.net/assets/downloads/2023/english/ ocindex_profile_myanmar_2023.pdf.
  2. “Online Scam Operations and Trafficking into Forced Criminality in Southeast Asia: Recommendations for a Human Rights Response,” UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2023, https://bangkok.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/wp_files/2023/08/ONLINE-SCAM-OPERATIONS-2582023.pdf.
  3. “920余名在缅甸当阳等地实施跨境电信网络诈骗的中国籍犯罪嫌疑人被移交我方” [More Than 920 Chinese Suspects Who Committed Cross-Border Telecommunications Fraud in Dangyang, Myanmar, and Other Places Were Transferred to Our Side], People’s Daily, April 23, 2025, http://society.people.com.cn/n1/2025/0423/c1008-40466655.html.
  4. Grant Peck, “East, Southeast Asia Had Record Methamphetamine Seizures Last Year. Profits Remain in the Billions,” Associated Press, May 28, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/crystal-methamphetamine-golden-triangle-shan-ketamine-cb5de08da123b150210793a667c0c149.
  5. Lorenzo Colantoni and Matthew Burnett-Stuart, “Crimes Associated with Critical Minerals in Southeast Asia: Trends, Challenges and Solutions,” UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, April 2025, https://unicri.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/Crimes-Associated-with-Critical-Minerals-Southeast-Asia-Apr-2025.pdf.
  6. Harold Thibault, “How China Has Relocated Its Most Polluting Mines to War-Torn Myanmar,” Le Monde, July 23, 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/economy/article/2025/07/23/how-china-has-relocated-its-most-polluting-mines-to-war-torn-myanmar_6743650_19.html.
  7. “Unearthing the Cost: Rare Earth Mining in Myanmar’s War-Torn Regions,” Institute for Strategy and Policy–Myanmar, June 2025, https://ispmyanmar.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Rare-Earth-Mining-in-Myanmars-War-Torn-Regions.pdf.
  8. This term covers a range of illicit activities, including crypto scams, phishing attacks, romance fraud, and other deceptive methods. One of the most notorious forms across the Mekong is “pig butchering,” a long-term and sophisticated scam in which victims are befriended and seduced through social media and messaging apps before being lured into fake investment schemes.
  9. Fabien Koh, “Lessons from S$3b Money Laundering Case Will Strengthen Singapore’s Approach to Tackling Threat: PM Wong,” CNA, June 26, 2024, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/lessons-s3-billion-case-help-strengthen-singapores-approach-tackling-money-laundering-pm-wong-4436876.
  10. “Southeast Asia Scammers Stole Up to US$37 Billion in 2023; Singapore ‘Tip of the Iceberg’: UN,” Bloomberg, October 7, 2024, available at https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3281395/southeast-asia-scammers-stole-us37-billion-2023-singapore-tip-iceberg-un.
  11. Vitit Muntarbhorn, “End of Mission Statement: United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia,” Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, August 26, 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/kh/2022-08-26/SR-Cambodia-End-of-Mission-Statement.pdf.
  12. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on March 17, 2025,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), March 17, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/202503/t20250317_11577262.html.
  13. “China-ASEAN Cooperation Yields Fruitful, Win-Win Results: Report,” Xinhua, April 11, 2025, https://english.news.cn/20250411/2004e3c2733740c2bfd81ce6bc487a48/c.html.
  14. “Inflection Point: Global Implications of Scam Centers, Underground Banking and Illicit Online Marketplaces in Southeast Asia,” UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Technical Policy Brief, 2025, https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/ Publications/2025/Inflection_Point_2025.pdf.
  15. Reflecting the gravity of the issue, the PRC passed in 2022 the Anti-Telecom and Online Fraud Law (反电信网络诈骗法), with Article 1 stating that “this law is formulated…to prevent, curb, and punish telecom and online fraud, strengthen efforts to counter telecom and online fraud, protect the lawful rights and interests of citizens and organizations, and safeguard social stability and national security.” The full text is available at https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-09/02/content_5708119.htm.
  16. See, for instance, Muhammad Faizal Bin Abdul Rahman, “Cyber Clashes Between Cambodia and Thailand Threaten ASEAN Stability,” Modern Diplomacy, July 21, 2025, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/07/21/cyber-clashes-between-cambodia-and-thailand-threaten-asean-stability; and Angela Suriyasenee and Nathan Ruser, “Thailand-Cambodia Conflict: Legacy Politics and Premeditated Escalation,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), July 29, 2025, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/thailand-cambodia-conflict-legacy-politics-and-premeditated-escalation. See also “Thai Cyber Police Track Scam Millions to Cambodian Firm, Hun Sen Family Link Probed,” Nation (Thailand), June 16, 2025, https://www.nationthailand.com/news/politics/40051321.
  17. Lizzette Marrero, “Feeding the Beast: The Role of Myanmar’s Illicit Economies in Continued State Instability,” International Affairs Review, June 15, 2018, https://scholarspace.library.gwu.edu/concern/gw_works/rf55z831b; and Alastair MacBeath, “Cashing In on Conflict: Illicit Economies and the Myanmar Civil War,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, March 2025, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Alastair-MacBeath-Cashing-in-on-conflict-Illicit-economies-and-the-Myanmar-civil-war-GI-TOC-March-2025.pdf.
  18. Delphine Allès, “Premises, Policies and Multilateral Whitewashing of Broad Security Doctrines,” European Review of International Studies 6, no. 1 (2019): 5–26.
  19. Extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties are cornerstones of international criminal law. Together, they allow states to pursue fugitives, secure evidence abroad, and ensure that justice systems can function effectively across borders while respecting sovereignty and legal safeguards.
  20. Wang Ke, “中国参与澜沧江—湄公河次区域警务合作的影响因素及对策研究” [Research on the Influencing Factors and Countermeasures of China’s Participation in Police Cooperation in Lancang-Mekong Subregion], People’s Public Security University of China, 2019; and Tan Xiangyu, “中国向老挝请求刑事司法协助研究” [China Requests Laos For Criminal Judicial Assistance], Guangxi University, 2022.
  21. See Mathieu Duchâtel, Oliver Bräuner, and Hang Zhou, “Protecting China’s Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift Away from Non-interference,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Policy Paper, June 2014; and Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).
  22. The term “core interests” refers to issues of sovereignty, security, and development on which the Chinese party-state refuses to negotiate or compromise. Broadly defined, these encompass both military and nontraditional threats to China’s territorial integrity, regime stability, and economic model. For more details, see “新时代的中国国家安全” [China’s National Security in the New Era], PRC Government Portal, May, 12, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202505/content_7023405.htm.
  23. Zi Yang, “Securing China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Special Report, November 2018.
  24. For more details about the LM-LECC, see Simon Menet, “Protéger, contrôler et façonner: La stratégie sécuritaire de la Chine dans le Mékong,” Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, June 2023, https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/recherches-et-documents/2023/072023-2.pdf.
  25. “Thailand-Myanmar-China Coordination Meeting on Combatting Telecommunications Fraud,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Thailand), February 28, 2025, https://www.mfa.go.th/en/content/trilat-on-telecommunications-fraud-en.
  26. “中泰缅老四国警方启动合作打击赌诈集团专项联合行动” [Police from China, Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos Launch Joint Operation to Combat Gambling Scams], China Daily, August 18, 2023, https://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202308/18/WS64df64c8a3109d7585e49d6f.html.
  27. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Isaac Kardon, and Cameron Waltz, “A New World Cop on the Beat? China’s Internal Security Outreach under the Global Security Initiative,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2025, https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Kardon%20et%20al._China%20Security-2025.pdf.
  28. “苏林部长会见中国国家安全部副部长” [Minister To Lam Meets with Chinese Vice Minister of State Security], Vietnam People’s Public Security Newspaper, November 26, 2020.
  29. These meetings are generally held on a biannual basis, with the exception of a hiatus during the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2018 the PRC and Laos convened their first and only Ministerial Meeting on Law Enforcement Cooperation (执法合作部级会晤), co-chaired by then MPS vice-minister Li Wei. By contrast, the MPS has yet to establish an institutionalized bilateral ministerial meeting with Thailand.
  30. “China Names Point Man on Scam Gangs,” Bangkok Post, February 19, 2025, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2963783/china-names-point-man-on-scam-gangs.
  31. “提起公诉！缅北白家犯罪集团专案细节曝光” [Public Prosecution! Details Revealed on the Baijia Criminal Group Investigation in Northern Myanmar], CCTV, July 11, 2025, https://content-static.cctvnews.cctv.com/snow-book/index.html?item_id=18015326321363242561&toc_style_id=feeds_default&share_to=wechat&track_id=5a137c41-9b2c-4794-9b92-0035dd1608e2.
  32. “Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia: A Growing Threat to Global Peace and Security,” USIP, Senior Study Group Final Report, May 2024, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2024-05/ssg_transnational-crime-southeast-asia.pdf; and Nectar Gan, “How Online Scam Warlords Have Made China Start to Lose Patience with Myanmar’s Junta,” CNN, December 19, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/19/china/myanmar-conflict-china-scam-centers-analysis-intl-hnk.
  33. Since 2002, the Yunnan Police College has hosted 197 mid- and high-level international law-enforcement training sessions and trained over 4,100 foreign law-enforcement officers from 76 countries.
  34. “江西警察 学院举行 2022 年泰国打击网络犯罪研讨班线上开班仪式” [Jiangxi Police Academy held the Online Opening Ceremony of the 2022 Thai Cybercrime Seminar], Jiangxi Police Institute, December 14, 2022.
  35. The Confucius Institute established in Chulalongkorn University provides Chinese-language courses for the Institute of Forensic Medicine at the Thai Police Hospital alongside other courses for the immigration and police departments. See“泰国法医们的汉语情结” [The Chinese Complex of Thai Forensic Doctors], People’s Daily, January 11, 2017.
  36. Ian Storey, “Mekong River Patrols in Full Swing but Challenges Remain,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, February 21, 2012, https://jamestown.org/program/mekong-river-patrols-in-full-swing-but-challenges-remain.
  37. Guan Jian, “区域安全公共 产品供给的‘中国方案’—中老缅泰湄公河联合执法合作机制研究” [A “China Program” for the Supply of Regional Security Public Goods: A Study on the Joint Law-Enforcement Cooperation Mechanism of the Mekong River of China, Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar], Journal of Sun Yat-Sen University (Social Science Edition), 2019.
  38. Guo Lian, “中老缅泰澜湄流域警务合作探索与实践 —以中泰警务合作 为例” [Exploration and Practice of Police Cooperation in the Mekong Basin of China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand—the Case of China-Thailand Police Cooperation], Journal of Yunnan Police College, 2021.
  39. “Wang Yi: The Next Decade of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Holds Promising Prospects,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC), August 15, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbzhd/202508/t20250817_11691366.html.
  40. See “Mekong-Australia Program on Transnational Crime,” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia), September 2020, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/map-tnc-briefing-note.pdf.
  41. Author’s interview with Cambodian law enforcement in Phnom Penh, December 2023.
  42. “Transnational Crime and Geopolitical Contestation along the Mekong,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report, no. 332, August 18, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/332-transnational-crime-and-geopolitical-contestation-mekong.
  43. “Casinos, Money Laundering, Underground Banking, and Transnational Organized Crime in East and Southeast Asia: A Hidden and Accelerating Threat,” UNODC, Technical Policy Brief, January 2024, https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2024/Casino_Underground_Banking_Report_2024.pdf.
  44. Ibid. See also “Cambodia Business Advisory on High-Risk Investments and Interactions,” U.S. Department of State, November 20, 2021, https://www.state.gov/cambodia-business-advisory-on-high-risk-investments-and-interactions.
  45. See, for instance, Emmanuel Jourda, “L’enrôlement des brigands et des sociétés secrètes dans la révolution chinoise (1919–1954),” Sociétés politiques comparées, May 2023, http://www.fasopo.org/sites/default/files/varia2_n60.pdf; and Lynette H. Ong, Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022).
  46. Selina Ho, Xue Gong, and Carla P. Freeman, “China’s Interventions in ‘Gray Special Economic Zones’ in Southeast Asia’s Borderlands,” Journal of Contemporary China (2025), https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2025.2484205.
  47. Shibani Mahtani, Christian Shepherd, and Pei-Lin Wu, “China Cultivated High-Rolling Crime Families before Turning on Them,” Washington Post, June 19, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/19/china-online-scams-myanmar-trafficking.
  48. Ho et al., “China’s Interventions in ‘Gray Special Economic Zones’ in Southeast Asia’s Borderlands.”
  49. Martin Thorley, “A Changing Landscape: China’s New Model of Global Governance and Its Impact on Organized Crime,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, May 2024, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Martin-Thorley-A-changing-landscape-Chinas-new-model-of-global-governance-and-its-impact-on-organized-crime-GI-TOC-May-2024.pdf.
  50. Mainland Southeast Asia’s pivotal location provides the PRC with both direct access to the Indian Ocean that bypasses the Strait of Malacca and a vital land bridge into Southeast Asia’s archipelagic space, especially with the ongoing development of railway links through Laos and Thailand. At the same time, the region has become a key arena of competition, where China, the United States, Japan, Australia, India, and South Korea pursue tailored regional strategies. For more details about Chinese thinking on strategic space, see Nadège Rolland, “Mapping China’s Strategic Space,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 111, September 2024, https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr111_rolland_september2024.pdf.
  51. Karuna Nandkumar, “Diplomacy at the Periphery: How the PRC’s Border Provinces Shape Neighborhood Engagement,” NBR, Mapping China’s Strategic Space, Borderlands Project, August 6, 2025, https://strategicspace.nbr.org/diplomacy-at-the-periphery-how-the-prcs-border-provinces-shape-neighborhood-engagement.
  52. Nadège Rolland, “China’s Vision for a New World Order,” NBR, NBR Special Report, no. 83, January 2020, https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr83_chinasvision_jan2020.pdf.
  53. The other three overarching initiatives of Xi’s diplomacy are the Global Development Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative.
  54. “全球安全倡议概念文件（全文）” [Global Security Initiative Concept Paper (Full Text)], Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, February 21, 2023, http://www.lmcchina.org/2023-02/21/content_42274271.htm.
  55. Author’s interview with law enforcement in Bangkok, November 2023. See also a 2024 report by the China Institute of International Studies that discussed China’s decision to increase its annual drug control donation to the UNODC to $2 million as part of the implementation of the Global Security Initiative. The report also noted that China provided funding for eight global operations of Interpol.
  56. Author’s interview with law enforcement in Phnom Penh, December 2023.
  57. Danielle Tan, “Du communisme au néolibéralisme: le rôle des réseaux chinois dans la transformation de l’État au Laos,” Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, 2011.
  58. Geographic coordinates of the facilities: Muang Mo (20°26’12.08”N, 100°07’22.38”E) and Ban Xieng Kok (20°53’44.82”N, 100°36’45.21”E). See “‘见证’执法湄公河(三):中、 老两国执法人员默契合作 共同守护流域安全 20180907” [“Witness” Enforcement of the Mekong River (3): Chinese and Lao Law-Enforcement Officers Cooperate Tacitly to Jointly Protect the Safety of the River Basin 20180907], CCTV, September 7, 2018, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fqVefHYfxaQ.
  59. Greg Raymond, “Jagged Sphere: China’s Quest for Infrastructure and Influence in Mainland Southeast Asia,” Lowy Institute, June 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/RAYMOND%20China%20Infrastructure%20Sphere%20of%20Influence%20COMPLETE%20PDF.pdf
  60. “中军军弘亮剑海外显神威老挝公司护航丝路立新功” [The Chinese Army’s Junhong Liang Sword Overseas Demonstrates Power and Laos Company Escorts the Silk Road and Makes New Contributions], Zhongjun Junhong Group (WeChat), August 26, 2021.
  61. “FSG Signed Cooperation Framework Agreement with Laos Air Force Headquarters,” Frontier Services Group, January 5, 2023, https://archive.ph/6kHDf; and “FSG Signed EPC Contract of Lao Air Force Office Building Project,” Frontier Services Group, December 29, 2020, https://archive.ph/hDJt9.
  62. “中华人民共和国和越南社会主义共和国关于持续深化全面战略合作伙伴关系、加快构建具有战略意义的中越命运共同体的联合声明” [Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Continuously Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership and Accelerating the Building of a China-Vietnam Community of Shared Future with Strategic Significance], PRC Government Portal, April 15, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202504/content_7018895.htm.
  63. “中华人民共和国和老挝人民民主共和国联合声明（全文）” [Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Full Text)], PRC Government Portal, October 12, 2024, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zyxw/202412/t20241218_11497128.shtml; and “中华人民共和国和柬埔寨王国关于构建新时代全天候中柬命运共同体、落实三大全球倡议的联合声明” [Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Kingdom of Cambodia on Building an All-Weather China-Cambodia Community with a Shared Future in the New Era and Implementing Three Major Global Initiatives], Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC), April 18, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202504/t20250418_11596815.shtml.
  64. For more details on the exports of Chinese surveillance practices and equipment, see “Mapping China’s Tech Giants,” ASPI, Database, https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/map; “The Digital Silk Road: China and the Rise of Digital Repression in the Indo-Pacific,” Article 19, 2024, https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/DSR_final.pdf; Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Dealing with Demand for China’s Global Surveillance Exports,” Brookings Institution, April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/dealing-with-demand-for-chinas-global-surveillance-exports; and Menet, “Protéger, contrôler et façonner.”
  65. “Interview: China’s Anti-Corruption Drive ‘Role Model’ for Other Countries—Cambodian Graft-Buster,” Xinhua, March 6, 2018, https://archive.ph/fI8xC.
  66. Cheng Wen, “访越散记” [Notes on a Visit to Vietnam], Procuratorate Daily, October 29, 2023, https://newspaper.jcrb.com/2023/20231029/20231029_004/20231029_004_2.htm.
  67. Ma Zhuang and Ma Zhonghong, “东南亚地区中国公民跨境网络犯罪及治理研究” [Cross-Border Cyber Crime of Chinese Citizens in Southeast Asian and Its Governance], Southeast Asian Affairs (2021); and Zhang Hao, “缅甸涉我电信网络诈骗犯罪治理：现状、困境及对策” [Governance of Myanmar-Related Telecom and Cyber Fraud Crimes Involving China: Current Status, Dilemmas, and Countermeasures], Journal of Hubei University of Police (2025).
  68. Guan, “区域安全公共 产品供给的”中国方案”—中老缅泰湄公河联合执法合作机制研究.”

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