China’s imagined strategic space may include specific geographic areas outside of its national borders, such as claimed or contested territories on land and at sea. It may be envisioned as a defensive buffer zone, or as a projected sphere of influence. It may not be geographically grounded and more akin to the space China needs to fulfill its development and security goals.
Mental maps and strategic goals are inextricably linked.
This section will present a collection of contributions exploring the geopolitical underpinnings, spatial representations, and new frontiers of China’s strategic space. Watch for more publications to come.
By dint of their geographies, partnerships, development imperatives, and broader objectives, China and India have had overlapping strategic spaces since India became independent in 1947
We hear a lot today about China’s border conflicts, from high-altitude skirmishes with Indian forces in the Himalayas to legal tussles over maritime sovereignty in
With an increasingly powerful People’s Republic of China (PRC) under paramount leader Xi Jinping engaging in meteoric military-maritime buildup and pressing disputed sovereignty claims with
The geopolitical significance of the Pacific and Indian Oceans has been a prominent issue in the Chinese political and diplomatic discourse. In 2013, Xi Jinping
China’s strategic conception of and engagement with outer space has evolved over time depending on each major leader’s personal ambition for the country as well
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has significantly modernized and expanded its naval capabilities, reshaping the maritime balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. To
The digital architecture of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is an expanding strategic space. As both an imagined and physical space, the Digital Silk
“Energy security” is broadly defined in the literature as meaning the reliable and affordable supply of energy, but discussions are often decidedly oil-centric. Indeed, both
Over the last two decades, China has significantly expanded its polar agenda and activities. It is a long-term strategic priority for China to establish itself
Since Xi Jinping became the general-secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the practices and logics of Chinese foreign policy have changed enormously. China’s ambitions
In October 2014 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) held its 17th International Symposium Course, which was attended by 48 international representatives in Beijing, including the
During the 1990s and 2000s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) paid little attention to Eastern European countries that had moved away from socialism.[1] Its